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ABSTRACT
Dulebenets, Maxim A. MS. The University of Memphis. August, 2012.
Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety and Prioritizing Model Development. Major
Professor: Dr. Mihalis M. Golias
The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) provides funding
to state DOTs to implement highway-rail grade crossing improvement programs.
These programs are suspected to develop particular safety improvement actions in
order to decrease the number of accidents at highway-rail grade crossings. The current
work is directed to consider various hazard index/accident prediction methodologies,
carefully investigate hazard index/accident prediction methods, applied by Tennessee
Department of Transportation (TDOT), develop a model to allocate available
monetary resources for upgrades of highway-rail grade crossings in the State of
Tennessee and maximize the total benefits in terms of accident and severity reduction.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Under title 23, United States Code, Section 130 (hereafter referred to as
“Section 130”), the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) provides
funding assistance to state departments of transportation to implement highway-rail
grade crossing improvement programs. These programs are dedicated to reducing
crashes at highway-rail grade crossings through safety infrastructure improvements.
State departments of transportation (DOT) are required to meet specific reporting
criteria under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient, Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) to assess the progress and effectiveness of
implementing highway-rail crossing programs. More specifically under Section 130
requirements, state departments of transportation should compile and analyze data
(e.g., crash data, traffic data, physical characteristic, etc.) that will allow informed
decisions to prioritize highway-rail grade crossing improvements. Programs to
prioritize improvements, performed at the discretion of the state DOT, are encouraged
to include evaluation of data compilation and analysis methods to ensure
comprehensive and efficient programs (Ogden, 2007).
According to USDOT, prioritization of grade crossings for improvement is
based on several factors. A significant and integral portion of prioritization programs
is the identification of hazard or collision potential associated with a crossing. There
are a variety of formulae developed for ranking rail-highway grade crossing hazard
indices or collision prediction. Hazard indices rank crossings in relative terms of risk,
hence the larger the calculated index the more hazardous a crossing; whereas collision
prediction formulae compute predicted collision frequency at the crossing. In addition
to hazard index or collision prediction, consideration of additional factors to prioritize
1

crossing improvements include but are not limited to: cost, site inspection, exposure
(number of persons using a crossing), crossing use by school buses, pedestrians,
bicyclists, or vehicles carrying hazardous material.
Efforts to enhance prioritization programs, as previously stated, have led to
investigation into the efficiency of current methods employed by state DOT’s to index
hazard or predict collisions (see Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000; Faghri & Demetsky,
1986; Ogden, 2007). The structure of the these reports was to: a) compile current
accident prediction methods (referred to as methods or models within this review)
used by state departments of transportation through literature review and DOT
surveys, b) evaluate the effectiveness of current hazard/accident prediction formulae
and comparatively assess the methods using statistical analysis tools, and c) make
recommendations on accident prediction methods for use by their state DOT based
upon the findings. Summary of the literature evaluating the effectiveness of currently
used hazard indices and collision prediction methods are presented in the next section.
The scope of the current work also includes investigation of accident
prediction/hazard index models, currently used by different states, applying of those
models to all at grade public highway-railroad crossings of Tennessee. Besides, all
considered models were compared with US DOT Accident Prediction Model.
Using the accident prediction model, employed by TDOT and described
carefully in the chapter 3, two different approaches will be developed, such as Sorting
Algorithm (SA) and Mathematical Model (MM), in order to properly allocate
monetary resources and to achieve the maximum possible increasing of safety at
highway-grade crossings. Both solution methods were compared in the computational
results’ section. All necessary conclusions and recommendations along with the scope
of future research are provided as well.
2

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Statistical Analyses of Existing Hazard Indices and Collision Prediction Methods
In this section literature is summarized that, as previously mentioned,
compared the performance of current methods used by DOT’s to prioritize grade
crossings. Three comprehensive studies are discussed in this section. These reports
presented comprehensive statistical analyses of factors influence on accident
prediction and method performance as well as evaluated the efficacy of current DOT
methods prediction capability. Comparative analyses of these reports and conclusions
which can be drawn are also presented in the next three subsections.
State of Virginia
A study performed under the Virginia Highway & Transportation Research
Council identified current collision prediction and hazard indexing models used
nationally, and evaluated the representative models’ ability to use available data in
predicting hazard potential, and recommended methods for future use by the Rail and
Public Transportation Division to predict accident potential at highway-rail grade
crossings (Faghri & Demetsky, 1986). The report identified 13 nationally recognized
models (shown in Table 1), which are currently or have previously been employed
with success by multiple state DOTs for the prediction of hazard/accident potential at
highway-rail grade crossings as of March 1986.
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Table 1
Nationally Recognized Hazard Prediction Models
Coleman-Stewart
Oregon
Peabody-Dimmick
North Dakota Rating System
Mississippi
Idaho
New Hampshire
Utah
Ohio
City of Detroit
Wisconsin
DOT (USDOT)
Costa Contra County
(California)
Source: Faghri and Demetsky (1986)
In addition to the review of the current methods, the report presented a survey
of state departments of transportation current methodology employed to predict
hazard/accidents at highway-rail grade crossings. Survey respondents from 45 states
provided the method, and length of time these methods have been employed. Survey
results, are shown in Figure 1. The survey showed roughly 32% of the states employ
unique individual formulae, and another 30% use the DOT Formula (also identified as
USDOT Formula within this report). According to the survey, about 22% used either
the New Hampshire or modified version and about 8% Peabody-Dimmick Methods or
a modified version of the original method that is particular to that states’ criteria. The
method employed by each state is largely dependent on data availability and key
factors used as predictor variables for the particular method. As part of the survey, the
study identified the factors considered in reported methods. Table 2 presents the
survey responses to the factors used in the prediction models by the states surveyed.
Survey results showed that all 13 models used by 43 of the 45 states consider
vehicular and train daily volume as a prediction factor within the model’s formulae. In
addition to vehicular and train volumes were existing crossing protection (i.e., cross
bucks, flashing lights, gates, etc.) and number of tracks. The collision prediction or
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hazard index method of choice is inherently dependent upon the availability of data
and the factors that the prediction formulae require.

Figure 1 Utilization of Models to Predict Hazard/Accidents by State in 1986
Source: Faghri and Demetsky (1986)

Of the 13 recognized methods (shown in Table 1), currently used or previously
used with success, five methods were tested and evaluated, as part of the study, to
determine the methods prediction ability to that of observed accident data. The
selection was based upon the available documentation of each method’s development,
testing, verification, and application. The five formulae selected for evaluation
(shown in Table 3) were categorized into two basic groups (relative and absolute)
based on each method’s empirical formulae used for calculating hazard at highwayrail grade crossings (Faghri & Demetsky, 1986). The relative category group
produced a measure of relative hazard (index of risk of hazard) for a variety of
crossings which is used to rank crossings. The absolute category produces an
expected number of accidents over a certain period of time, and the number of
5

prevented accidents that may be observed if improvements are made. The latter
method produces an expected number of accidents and the reduction of the number of
accidents at any crossing.

Table 2
Factors Considered in the Existing Formulae
Number of Formulae
Factor Considered
Containing the Factor
(n=13)
Vehicles per day
13
Trains per day
13
Existing protection
10
Sight distance
7
Train Speed
6
Number of tracks
9
Highway vehicular speed
5
Accident records
5
Condition or type of
3
crossing
Condition of approaches
3
Type of train
3
Approach gradient
2
Angle of crossing
2
Pedestrian hazard
2
Distribution of vehicular
and/or train volumes
3
throughout the day
Time Crossing is blocked
1
Darkness
1
Number of traffic lanes
2
School buses and/or carriers
0
of hazardous materials
Source: Faghri and Demetsky (1986)
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Number of States Using
the Factor in their
Formulae (n=45)
43
43
37
14
13
22
22
23
20
6
5
6
5
1
14
1
1
15
5

Table 3
Methods Selected for Evaluation and Testing
Relative Formulae Absolute Formulae
New Hampshire
DOT
Peabody-Dimmick
NCHRP No. 50 (Virginia’s Method: the current applied method
by the conducting organization at that time)
Coleman-Stewart
Source: Faghri and Demetsky (1986)
The primary statistical analysis tool used by researchers for this study was the
power factor. A statistical chi-square test was performed for the four absolute
methods to determine a goodness of fit using 1,536 crossings. Ancillary and
significance statistical tests were performed to determine if sight distance and school
bus traffic would affect results when included in hazard/accident prediction methods.
Results of the chi-square test on the four absolute models revealed that the DOT
formula produced the closest fit to the actual number of accidents at all crossings. The
power factor analysis showed that the DOT model outperformed the other four
absolute models, and suggested that inclusion of the DOT factors for percentiles of
hazard would significantly increase the DOT formulae performance. The results also
showed that the effects of sight distance and school bus traffic are not statistically
significant when considering the influence on hazard/accident prediction formula. The
report recommends consideration of the severity potential that school buses may
present over typical crossing accidents be taken into consideration during final site
evaluations. This report’s findings recommended that use of the DOT hazard
prediction model be employed in lieu of the NCHRP No. 50 that was in use at the
time. In addition the report recommended the DOT resource allocation model could
be used if the Virginia DOT saw the criteria that model uses to prioritize crossings
applicable. This report, although dated, did provide accurate evaluation and
7

comparison of the current or previously employed formula used to rank crossings, by
using a large crossing sample size and applicable statistical methods.
State of Illinois
A research report prepared by the Illinois Transportation Research Center in
cooperation with the Illinois DOT evaluated the effectiveness of the Expected
Accident Frequency (EAF) formula used by the State of Illinois at the time, reviewed
the hazard index and accident prediction formulae from other states, and made
recommendations of further use of the EAF or adoption of an alternative approach,
while compiling information about rail-bicycle and rail-pedestrian stand-alone
crossings (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000). The researchers conducted a survey of state
DOTs methodology and policies for accident prediction models or hazard indexing
formulae used to prioritize highway-rail grade crossings. The survey elicited
responses from 31 states. Results of the survey included: a) no formal methodology,
b) hazard index/accident prediction formula, c) top crossings listed by the US DOT
rating system, and d) top 20 crossings from FRA list (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000).
The report summarized two sets of variables which are used in hazard index or
accident prediction formulae, threshold limits used to reduce the number of crossings
included for further consideration, and other criteria considered by state DOTs in their
process (shown in Table 4).
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Table 4
Variables in Exisitng Hazard Index/Accident Prediction Formulae
Thresholds used by other
Other criteria in addition
Variable in Formulae
DOTs
to formula
Daily average train
Highest hazard rating
Adjacent land use and
movement by type and
funding allows
development
length
Speed of each type of train
One crash every ten years Political considerations
Number of school bus
No firm minimum, but
Near-miss reports from
passengers
ADT > 1,000 vpd
railroad
Average daily train traffic
Project must be in top 1/3 Heavily used truck/bus
(day/night, switch/through) of Index
route
Driveways and streets
New Hampshire Index >
Age and condition of
intersections near crossing
4,000
equipment
Crash history (Number of
USDOT predicted
Restricted sight distance
crashes in n years)
accidents (PA) > 0.075
Approach grade
3 crashes within 5 years
Number of blind quadrants One crash every nine
years
Angle of intersection
Curvature of the roadway
Surface type
Heavy truck traffic
Factor for hazardous
materials
Average daily traffic
Average daily school bus
traffic
Number of tracks
Number of lanes
Type of warning device
Type of area
Posted speed limit
Source: Elzohairy and Benekohal (2000)
The criteria used to prioritize crossings for improvements according to survey
respondents included: a) higher hazard index/predicted accident, b) benefit/cost
analysis, c) site review of vehicle types (school bus, mass transit), d) engineering
judgment and crossing geometry, e) public concern/complaint, f) service condition,
and g) sight distance (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000). The report included a literature
9

review identifying existing accident prediction/hazard index formula. The report goes
further to state that when prediction formulae are used in consideration of costeffective allocations of improvement funds, absolute models present the most support
for resource allocation decisions as opposed to hazard index rankings (Elzohairy &
Benekohal, 2000). The literature review presented by Elzohairy and Benekohal (2000)
identified 6 accident prediction models and 5 hazard indexing models (shown in table
5).

Table 5
Existing Methods Identified in Literature
Accident Prediction Formulae
Hazard Index Formulae
Peabody-Dimmick
Illinois Commerce Commission
Oregon Highway Commission
Mississippi Formula
NCHRP Report 50
The Oregon Method
Coleman-Stewart Model
New Hampshire Formula
TSC Model
Contra Costa County (California)
DOT Accident Prediction Formula
Source: Elzohairy and Benekohal (2000)
The report provides a comprehensive statistical analysis of the variables that
may contribute to crash occurrence presented in two categories: a) population-based
rates, and b) traffic-based rates (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000). The results of the
statistical analysis showed the relationship between population and crash rates is best
described by a polynomial function. The general trend of that function was described
such that crash rates will increase as the population per crossing increases. This
relationship was determined to be significant when applied to the average number of
accidents per county, a given number of crossings and population. The populationbased rates did not directly reflect the traffic volume, and the traffic-based rates were
employed to overcome this deficiency (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000). The
correlation between average number of crashes per year and other traffic-based
10

parameters (e.g., average daily traffic, number of total trains, number of tracks, etc.)
were investigated using linear and nonlinear regression analysis for the following
models: EAF, USDOT, Connecticut Hazard Index Formula, New Hampshire Index
used by Michigan, and the California Hazard Index Formula. Figure 2 below shows
the frequency of different formulae utilization by state in 2000.

Figure 2 Utilization of Models to Predict Hazard/Accidents by State in 2000
Source: Elzohairy and Benekohal (2000)
The survey showed around 48% of the states employ unique individual
formulae, and another 26% use the USDOT Formula. According to the survey, about
13% used the New Hampshire method and about 3% NCHRP Report 50 method. Ten
percent of states didn’t provide any information for this survey.
The report analyzed the efficacy of the EAF formula and other hazard
index/accident prediction formulae using an inventory of 6,423 crossings throughout
the State of Illinois. The suggested model for establishing a priority list, developed by
Elzohairy and Benekohal (2000) was the Illinois Hazard Index (IHI).
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The report presented step-wise regression analyses to determine what
relationships exist between accident frequency and contributing factors. The
dependent variable (number of accidents in five years) was compared with the
following factors to determine their potential as predictors:
 Average daily traffic (ADT)
 Number of lanes (NOL)
 Number of main tracks (NMT)
 Number of day time trains (NDTT)
 Number of nighttime trains (NNTT)
 Number of total trains (NTT)
 Number of day switch trains (NDST)
 Number of night switch trains NNST)
 Maximum timetable speed (MTS)
 Sight distance (SD)
 Other multiplicative variables: ADT x NTT, ADT x NDTT, NOL x NMT
Results of the analysis showed that a regression relation exists between the
dependent variable and the following predictors: ADT, NNTT, ADT x NTT, ADT x
NDTT and NOL x NMT.
The report employed ancillary and significance statistical analysis of the
effects of other factors on the IHI model including: time of day, type of area, and type
of warning device. Results showed that these factors (i.e., time of day, area, and
warning device), when separated into A separate formulae to consider each factor’s
impact on collision prediction solely, did not outperform models which employed
these factors in one formula simultaneously (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000).
12

The researchers conclude that the EAF formula should be replaced with the
models developed within this report, the several variations of the IHI, which more
accurately identified locations that need safety improvements. The recommended IHI
can potentially be applied to a crossing in any type of area (urban/rural), any with any
type of warning device. The report recommended further investigation into the use of
models with separate formulae for factors such as type of area (specifically to
consider highway functional class) is needed. The report also states that data from
selected sites should be used to compare reliability in selecting crossings in need of
improvement (Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000).
State of Missouri
A research report conducted by the University of Missouri-Columbia/Rolla in
cooperation with the Missouri DOT Research, Development, and Technology
Division identified models used by different states to prioritize highway-rail grade
crossing improvements, evaluate and rank the models based on expert panel review,
and recommend a replacement of the existing Exposure Index (EI) model that was
currently used by the Missouri DOT (Qureshi et al., 2003). The report evaluated the
following seven models: USDOT Accident Prediction Formula, California’s Hazard
Rating Formula, Connecticut’s Hazard Rating Formula, Modified New Hampshire
Formula, Kansas Design Hazard Rating Formula, Missouri’s Exposure Index
Formula, and Illinois modified IHI (developed within the previous research report).
The report developed a modified EI method to include in evaluation and analysis.
The report included expert panel results for highway-rail grade crossing objectives,
key variables, and eight criteria to evaluate models (Qureshi et al., 2003). Table 6 lists
the results of the expert panel.
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The evaluation of each model was performed by developing a baseline ranking
of 6 crossings by Missouri DOT staff. The baseline rankings, used as a reference point
to compare the performance of the models investigated, were developed for the list of
crossing by the expert panel compiled under the report. The accuracy of the model
was determined by comparing ranking of crossings to that of the baseline developed
by the expert panel (Qureshi et al., 2003). Table 7 presents the results of the
evaluation of the eight aforementioned models.

Table 6
Expert Panel Results for Model Evaluation
Objectives
Variables
Safety (should improve
Annual Daily Traffic
safety)
Weighting Factors
Approach Sight Distance
(account for importance in vs. recommended Sight
calculating number of
Distance
accidents of hazard index)
Data elements available in Stopping Sight Distance
crossing inventories
vs. Recommended Sight
databases
Distance
Crash rate = 0
Speed of train
Accurately predict
Number of passenger trains
accident frequency
Explainable and definable Speed of highway traffic
Priority
Should suggest crossing
treatments
Cover FHWA
requirements
Source: Qureshi et al. (2003)

Criteria for Evaluation
Accuracy of the model
Number of difficult
variables

Explanation ability

Number of key variables
Inclusion of crossing type

Number of unavailable
data variables
Total number of trains
Number of total variables
Clearance time for motorist Inclusion of weighting
to clear crossing
factors

Results of the report (shown in table 7) reveal that the EI model which was
used by Missouri DOT at the time of the study could be replaced with a more accurate
model. As shown in table 7, the EI model used by Missouri DOT at the time was
14

outperformed in terms of ranking crossings when compared to baseline rankings for
application to both passive and active controlled grade crossings. The report
recommended that investigation into the applicability of the Kansas Design Hazard
rating formula showed potential to replace the existing Missouri DOT method.
Further research was deemed necessary to determine the application of the Kansas
Model with larger sample sizes for evaluation. The report identifies concern for the
consideration of data variables necessary and available resources for additional data
collection and maintenance in inventory databases to employ the Kansas Model
(Qureshi et al., 2003).

Table 7
Summary of Evaluation Results
Crossing Control Type

Model by Ranking
1. California’ Hazard Index
2. IHI
3. Modified New Hampshire Formula
Passive
4. US DOT Accident Prediction Formula
5. Kansas’s Design Hazard Rating
6. Connecticut’s Hazard Index
7. Modified EI
8. EI
1. IHI
2. Kansas’s Design Hazard Rating
3. Connecticut’s Hazard Index
Active
4. EI
5. Modified EI
6. US DOT Accident Prediction Formula
7. Modified New Hampshire Formulas
8. California’ Hazard Index
Source: Qureshi et al. (2003)
The reports reviewed in the previous section identified nationally recognized
methods and presented statistical analysis for the comparison of the models presented.
The recommendations for employment of models for state DOTs, although not
15

reaching the same conclusion, show the rationale for choosing specific methodology
based upon model accuracy, available data, and model formulation for accident
prediction/hazard indexing. The reports reviewed provide guidance into adopting a
new or improve a current method of accident prediction/hazard indexing methods.
Each of the reports results, although not reaching the same conclusion, clearly define
the methodology and process for their investigation and recommendations for the
state DOT based on the pertinent criteria for that particular investigation. For
example, as shown in many states, sight distance is intrinsic and directly correlative to
accident rates, although no mathematical evidence supports this relationship. The
remainder of this report presents a review of the literature related to measuring
railroad crossing safety and countermeasure effects published in scientific journals.
Scientific Literature Review
While there is a significant amount of literature on the broader topic of
accident prediction models and their consistency, little attention has paid to accident
prediction and risk measurement in railroad crossings in the literature. Austin and
Carson (2002) note the shortcomings of the four mentioned methods (Peabody
Dimmick Formula, New Hampshire Index, NCHRP Hazard Index, USDOT Accident
Prediction formula) and point out the need for a consistent accident prediction
method. In particular, it is emphasized that the existing models focus on a restricted
set of factors effective on railroad crossing accidents and ignore important safety
factors.
Austin and Carson (2002) discuss three possible methods that can be used as
an accident prediction method: multiple linear regression, Poisson regression, and
Negative Binomial regression. Belle and Farr (1975) use multiple regression to
examine the factors affecting accident rates in 1,140 railroad crossings in Florida. As
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noted by Austin and Carson (2002) as well, multiple linear regression is discussed to
be inappropriate for accident prediction models due to inability of capturing negative
correlations and heteroscedasticity issues (see, e.g., Joshua & Garber, 1990; Jovanis &
Chang, 1986; Miaou & Lum, 1993). While Poisson regression may overcome these
drawbacks of the multiple linear regression, it requires that the probability distribution
of the number of accidents has equal expectation and variance values. Austin and
Carson (2002), however, show that the test data gathered from the FRA’s Office of
Safety highway-rail crossing inventory does not meet this requirement (in particular,
overdispersion is observed, i.e., the variance of the number of accidents is relatively
high compared to the expectation of the number of accidents in the data used); thus,
they utilize the negative binomial regression in their analyses. Their results conclude
not only how significantly but also to what extent different traffic, roadway, and
crossing characteristics influence railroad crossing accidents.
Lee, Park, and Nam (2005) also discuss compatibility of distinct statistical
tools for accident prediction in railroad crossings. They use data from 100 railroad
crossings in Korea for the period of September 2001 to April 2002. Analysis of this
data suggests that the Poisson regression is more compatible than the negative
binomial regression. Furthermore, they utilize zero-inflated Poisson regression, a
modification of the Poisson regression to overcome the case when too many zeros are
observed in the data than a regular Poisson process would predict. Similar to Austin
and Carson (2002), Lee et al. (2005) use their proposed method to discuss how
significantly different traffic, roadway, and crossing characteristics affect railroad
crossing accidents.
Oh, Washington, and Nam (2006) study railroad crossing accident prediction
methods for a data set collected from 162 crossings in Korea between years 1998 and
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2002. Altering from Austin and Carson (2002) and Lee et al. (2005), they use a
gamma model for the statistical analysis. Particularly, the reason for using the gamma
model was due to the presence of underdispersion in the data (i.e., the variance of the
number of accidents is relatively low compared to the expectation of the number of
accidents in data collected). The gamma model is then used to discuss the significance
of the effects of different traffic, roadway, and crossing characteristics on crossing
accidents.
While the previously discussed studies focused on estimating the number of
accidents, Hu, Li, and Lee (2010) and McCollister and Pflaum (2007) studied
prediction methods for severity of railroad crossing accidents. McCollister and
Pflaum (2007) proposed a logit model, which is commonly used for estimating
accident severities (see, e.g., Donnel & Connor, 1996; Kweon & Kockelman, 2003;
Shankar & Mannering, 1996), to report the factors affecting the injuries and fatalities
in the accidents along with the accidents using data from FRA’s Office of Safety
highway-rail crossing inventory. Hu et al. (2010) analyzed a data set of railroad
crossing accidents in Taiwan from 1995 to 1997 using a generalized logit model.
Their study revealed the significantly effective factors in severity of railroad crossing
accidents.
While the different studies use distinct statistical tools for accident prediction
in railroad crossings, the goals are two-fold: develop a statistically sound method to
estimate the accident rate at a given railroad crossing and reveal the factors
significantly affecting this rate. The estimated rate can be used in resource allocation
for upgrading railroad crossings, while the factors effecting accident rates can be used
in developing railroad crossing specific preemptive practices, which are referred to as
countermeasures. As noted by Washington and Oh (2007), there may be a set of
18

preemptive practices for a specific railroad crossing. In that case, accurately
predicting the success of countermeasures in reducing the risk, which can be
considered as the ultimate goal of crossing upgrades, is important for maximization of
risk reduction through effective allocation of the limited resources.
Washington and Oh (2007) document 18 countermeasures that are intended to
increase safety at railroad crossings. These countermeasures are gathered from an
extensive review of the literature. One may refer to Washington and Oh (2007) for
definition of these countermeasures and the studies focusing on each of these
countermeasures individually. They proposed a Bayesian data fusion method to
estimate the expected performance of each countermeasure. Saccomanno, Young-Jin
Park, and Fu (2007) develop a similar Bayesian data fusion method to predict
effectiveness of countermeasures regarding the characteristics of a crossing.
Yan, Richards, and Su (2010) uses a hierarchical tree-based regression method
to estimate the number of accidents at a given set of railroad crossings, which were
upgraded from cross-only bucks to stop signs, to analyze the effectiveness of stopsigns as a countermeasure. Furthermore, Yan et al. (2010) analyzed the factors
influencing the effectiveness of stop signs at crossings. Rudin-Brown, Lenné, Edquist,
and Navarro (2011) focus on the effectiveness of traffic lights and boom-barrier
controls in reducing railroad crossing accidents. They use a driver simulator on 25
drivers to demonstrate how traffic lights and boom-barrier controls may reduce
possible accidents at crossings due to driver behaviors.
Rudin-Brown et al. (2011) considered different kinds of traffic devices in
order to improve safety at road-rail level crossings. They investigated perception of
25 fully-licensed drivers aged between 20 and 50 years, using a driving simulator, for
two active level crossing traffic control devices (such as flashing lights with boom
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barriers and standard traffic lights) and passive control devices (stop signs). Results
showed that the less number of violations were observed at active level crossings than
those controlled by stop signs. It was indicated, that the majority (72%) of drivers
reported preferring flashing lights to traffic lights. Nevertheless, the installation of
traffic lights at real-world level crossings would not be likely to offer safety benefits
over and above those provided already by flashing lights with boom barriers. It was
concluded that it was necessary to continue upgrading of rail crossing with active
traffic control devices to increase the safety.
Wullems (2011) considered the issue of the low-cost level crossing warning
devices (LCLCWDs) adoptions at rail crossings. The author stated that the risk along
the network could be reduced by combination of low-cost and conventional level
crossing interventions, similar to what was done in the road environment. The paper
indicated that before application of LCLCWDs it was necessary to conduct a rigorous
risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses for these devices. The strategy for
progressing research and development of LCLCWDs and recommendations how the
Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) for Rail Innovation can apply it were provided in
the article as well.
Wigglesworth (2001) conducted a study of 85 consecutive railway crossing
deaths, connected with flashing light signals. The results showed that flashing light
signals gave inadequate stimulus at busy urban crossings, but many drivers behaved
similarly at both active and passive rural crossings. The author proposed to use
different kinds of signs for various rail crossings. For metropolitans and urban
crossings it was suggested to use boom barriers instead of flashing lights. Passive rail
crossings usually have small traffic volumes and it makes difficult to measure the
effectiveness of countermeasures. The paper concludes that it was necessary to
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conduct before and after studies at rail crossings to evaluate the reliability of warning
signs. Along with low-cost treatments, surrogate measures should be implemented.
Conclusion
From the reviewed literature the most commonly used prediction models, in
practice, are the Peabody Dimmick Formula, New Hampshire Index, NCHRP Hazard
Index, and USDOT Accident Prediction formula. The Peabody Dimmick Formula
gives an estimated number of accidents in a five year period considering the average
annual daily traffic, average daily train traffic, and a predetermined protection
coefficient. Nevertheless, as noted by Austin and Carson (2002), it lacks validity as
the data used to develop the formula was sampled from only crossings in rural
regions, and the predefined protection coefficient cannot capture the recent
advancements in protection methods at the railroad crossings. Similar to the Peabody
Dimmick Formula, the New Hampshire Index utilizes the average annual daily traffic,
average daily train traffic, and a protection factor to determine a hazard index. A large
value of the hazard index implies a greater risk at the railroad crossing. The New
Hampshire Index is modified by different states in various ways to include distinct
roadway characteristics such as number of lanes, sight distance, vertical sight
distance, crossing characteristics such as surface type, width of the crossing, approach
angle, and detailed traffic characteristics such as fast and slow train traffic, hazardous
material traffic, school bus traffic, train speeds, highway speeds, etc. These
modifications lead to several accident prediction formulae, which result in different
significance levels as discussed by Faghri and Demetsky (1986).
Furthermore, these variations of the use of the index created concern in its
accuracy (Oh et al., 2006). The NCHRP index estimates collision potential using the
daily traffic, train traffic, and a protection coefficient, which is defined separately for
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urban and rural areas. The main flaw of the aforementioned methods is that they
consider three basic factors to be the drivers of railroad crossing accidents; roadway
traffic, train traffic, and protection level at the crossing. Developed using the national
railroad crossing accident data of years 1981 through 1986, the USDOT formula
includes a variety of crossing characteristics such as maximum speed, highway lanes,
highway speed, and highway paved factor in accident prediction. These crossing
characteristics are discussed to be significantly related to crossing accidents based on
the 1981-1986 data. USDOT formula is discussed to be an improved prediction
method compared to the previous methods as it account for more explanatory factors
effecting railroad crossing safety. Nevertheless, as noted by Austin and Carson
(2002), the USDOT formula has shortcomings in weighting in contribution of
different safety factors in estimating accident rates as well as inaccuracies in formulae
updating. A number of alternative to these methods, found in the scientific literature,
may address some of these issues but are data intensive and their application requires
significant effort (data, modeling, dissemination) making their use restrictive by state
DOTs due to insufficient resources and/or marginal benefits.
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3. FRA PROCEDURE REVIEW AND EVALUATION
This review discusses the USDOT accident prediction model, accident
severity calculation, resource allocation procedure, and GradeDec software utility.
The accident prediction model, which is comprised of three formulae, was developed
to assist individual states in maintaining requirements under Federal-Aid Policy
Guidelines (FAPG). The accident prediction model is one portion of the US DOT
resource allocation procedure that is intended to predict, in absolute terms, the
likelihood of a collision over a period of time at a crossing. Additional equations
within the US DOT model are used to predict the likelihood of fatalities and injuries.
In order to provide assistance in grade crossing investment decision making processes
the FRA developed a highway-rail grade crossing investment analysis tool
GradeDec.NET (GradeDec). GradeDec gives the possibility to compare rail grade
crossings improvement alternatives, designed to mitigate highway-rail grade crossing
collision risk and other components of user costs. The following section of review
discusses the accident prediction formulae that are included in that model.
US DOT Highway Rail Grade Crossing Methods
As a general description, the US DOT accident prediction model combines
three independent equations to produce an accident prediction value. The three
equations were developed to include as much information possible in determining the
accident risk for a highway rail grade crossing. The first equation, also denoted as the
basic formula, equates an initial hazard ranking for a crossing based upon the
crossing’s physical and operational characteristics. The second equation uses average
historical accident rates over a period of time to determine an accident prediction
value. This procedure uses the assumption that future collisions will be the same as
previous accident occurrences. The third equation employs a normalizing constant,
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which is adjusted periodically, such that the procedure adheres to current accident
trends. The result of these three equations is a final collision prediction that considers
crossing conditions, historical accident data, and current accident trends to produce a
reliable accident prediction value, ranking highway rail grade crossing risk, and in
turn offering a comparative medium for crossing improvements based upon the
potential for risk reduction. The remainder of this chapter details the three equation
development, data factors, and processes.
Accident Prediction
The basic formula as stated previously produces an initial accident prediction
per year based upon the physical and operational characteristics of each crossing. The
technique used to develop the basic equation involved applying multiple non-linear
regression to crossing inventories and accident data contained in the FRA Railroad
Accident/Incident Reporting System (RAIRS). The equation can be expressed as a
series of factors from crossing characteristics that are maintained within the crossing
inventory. The basic equation is shown below

where:
a = initial collision prediction, collisions per year at the crossing
K = formula constant
EI = factor for exposure index based on product of highway and train traffic
MT = factor for number of main tracks
DT = factor for number of through trains per day during daylight
HP = factor for highway paved (yes or no)
MS = factor for maximum timetable speed
HT = factor for highway type
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HL = factor for number of highway lanes
The basic equation is developed for three g categories based upon traffic
control devices present at the crossing: passive, flashing and lights, and automatic
gates as shown in Figure 3.

.

Figure 3 Basic Equation Accident Prediction for Crossing Characteristic Factors
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Revised Second Edition.
(2007). Washington, DC: US DOT, FHWA.
The factors listed in Figure 3 can be equated and tabulated based upon known
crossing characteristics. The tabulated values are used to predict collisions based upon
particular characteristics for a crossing. The tabulated values for the three categories
are presented in Appendix A.
The final collision prediction formula is shown below
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B = second collision prediction, collisions per year at the crossing
a = initial collision prediction from basic formula, collisions per year at the
crossing
N/T = collision history prediction, collisions per year, where N is the number
of observed collisions in T years at the crossing

The final collisions prediction, B, can be tabulated based upon known crossing
factors and values for initial prediction, a, and historical collision rates, N/T presented
in Appendix B. The use of all obtainable historical collision data will provide the
most accurate prediction results. Collision data collected prior to warning device
infrastructure improvements should not be included in prediction calculations.
Historical data older than five years will have minimal improvement on collision
prediction accuracy.
Final collision prediction, A, applies normalizing constants to incorporate
current trends in collisions at rail-highway grade crossings. Originally these
normalizing constants are developed by periodically setting the sum of the predicted
accidents, for each category separately, of the top 20% most hazardous crossings
exactly equal to the number of accidents which occurred in a recent period for the top
20% of that group. Periodic updates of US DOT normalizing constants since
inception of the procedure are presented in Table 8 below.
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Table 8
Accident Prediction and Resource Allocation Procedure Normalizing Constants

Source: Federal Railroad Administration ACPD Constants 2010. US Department of
Transportation, FRA.
http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/safety/ACPDConstants2010.pdf

According to reporting for the most recently developed constants, the
normalizing constants were calculated by making the sum of calculated accident for
calendar years 2004-2008 equal to the sum of the observed accidents that occurred in
2009 at the same crossings. The process is performed for each of the three categories
of crossings to account for the trends in collisions in recent history. The current trend
for collisions, as depicted by the most recent set of normalizing constants, is
downward; which according to available crash data is representative of conditions.
The final collision prediction results from the US DOT accident prediction
formulae can be incorporated into accident severity calculations to consider
probabilities for fatal and injury accidents or into the resource allocation procedure to
evaluate improvement alternatives which are described in the following sections.
Accident Severity
Additional equations within the U.S. DOT model are used to predict the
likelihood of fatalities and injuries. The probability of a fatal accident given an
accident, P(FA|A), is expressed as:
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where:
CF = formula constant = 695
MS = factor for maximum timetable train speed
TT = factor for through trains per day
TS = factor for switch trains per day
UR = factor for urban or rural crossing
The probability of an injury accident given an accident is:

where:
P(FA|A) = probability of a fatal accident, given an accident
CI = formula constant = 4.280
MS = factor for maximum timetable train speed
TK = factor for number of tracks
UR = factor for urban or rural crossing
The equations for calculating values of the factors for the fatal accident
probability formula and the injury accident probability formula are listed in Figures 4
and 5. To simplify use of the formulae, the values of the factors have been tabulated
for typical values of crossing characteristics and are given in Figures 6 and 7 for the
fatal accident and injury accident probability formulae.
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Figure 4 Equations for Crossing Characteristic Factors for U.S. DOT Fatal Accident
Probability Formula
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Revised Second Edition.
(2007). Washington DC: US DOT, FHWA.
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Figure 5 Equations for Crossing Characteristic Factors for U.S. DOT Injury
Accident Probability Formula
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Revised Second
Edition.(2007). Washington DC: US DOT, FHWA.
Resource Allocation Procedure
Along with various economic analyses procedures, in order to improve safety
at railroad-highway crossings, the US.DOT developed a resource allocation
procedure. It assists state railway authorities to find those rail crossings which need to
be repaired first, and to most effectively separate available funds across multiple
highway-rail grade crossings.
The resource allocation procedure is directed to suggest various types of
crossing traffic control improvements with multiple degrees of risk reduction and cost
for implementation.
The procedure provides traffic control improvement alternatives for the
following:


For single track passive crossings two upgrade options exist:
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flashing lights or gates;


For multiple-track passive crossings, the model allows only the

gate option to be considered in accordance with the Federal-Aid Policy
Guide;


For flashing light crossings, the only improvement option is

gates;

Figure 6 Factor Values for U.S. DOT Fatal Accident Probability Formula
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Revised Second Edition.
(2007). Washington DC: US DOT, FHWA.
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Figure 7 Factor Values for U.S. DOT Injury Accident Probability Formula
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Revised Second Edition.
(2007). Washington DC: US DOT, FHWA.

The resource allocation procedure does not include improvement alternatives,
such as: illumination, crossing surface improvements, removing of visual
obstructions, train direction security improvements, etc. The initial data for the
procedure includes the following contents: the number of predicted collisions; the
safety effectiveness of flashing lights and automatic gates; cost of improvements; the
available budget.
The US DOT, California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), and William J.
Hedley each completed safety effectiveness studies for the equipment used in the
resource allocation procedure. Various effectiveness factors have been developed to
evaluate signal improvements applicable for the procedure as shown in Table 9.
These effectiveness factors represent the overall percentage in rail crossing collision
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reduction, taking place after application of the proposed improvements.

Table 9
Effectiveness of Active Crossing Warning Devices

Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986).
Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration.

As it as mentioned before, the model requires the information about the
improvement alternatives cost. At this stage, life-cycle costs of the devices (both
installation and maintenance costs) should be presented. Cost data for the resource
allocation procedure should be provided for each of the following items:


Passive devices to flashing lights; 



Passive devices to automatic gates; 



Flashing lights to gates; 

It is necessary to indicate the reasons during the process of cost assignment for
a particular project, taking into consideration average costs for all projects. To
estimate the cost effectiveness a special resource allocation algorithm, which would
be described below, should be used. The amount of funds available for application of
a particular cross signal projects is the fourth step for the resource allocation
procedure. The resource allocation procedure hierarchy, shown in Figure 8,
incorporates all steps which were described in detail above.
The resource allocation algorithm should be implemented for any proposed
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signal improvements. The main characteristics of this algorithm are Ej (the
effectiveness of installing a proposed warning device at a crossing with a lower class
warning device) and Cj (the corresponding cost of the proposed warning device). As
shown in Table 10, j = 1 for flashing lights installed at the passive crossing; j = 2 for
gates installed at the passive crossing; and j = 3 for gates installed at the crossing with
flashing lights.

Table 10
Effectiveness/Cost Symbol Matrix

Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986).
Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration.

34

Figure 8 Resource Allocation Procedure
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986).
Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration.

Most of all, the resource allocation procedure evaluates possible
improvements for both passive and flashing light traffic control devices. An example
presented by Ogden, 2007: If a single-track passive crossing, i, is considered, it could
be upgraded with either flashing lights, with an effectiveness of E1, or gates, with an
effectiveness of E2. The number of predicted collisions at crossing i is Ai. Therefore,
the reduced accidents per year are AiE1 for the flashing light option and AiE2 for the
gate option. The corresponding costs for these two improvements are C1 and C2. The
accident reduction/cost ratios for these improvements are AiE1/ C1 for flashing lights
and AiE2/C2 for gates. The rate of increase in accident reduction versus costs that
result from changing an initial decision to install flashing lights with a decision to
install gates at crossing i is referred to as the incremental accident reduction/cost ratio
and is equal to:
Ai (E2 – E1) / (C2 – C1)
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If a passive multiple-track crossing, i, is considered, the only improvement
option allowable would be installation of gates, with an effectiveness of E2, a cost of
C2, and an accident reduction/cost ratio of AiE2/C2. If crossing i was originally a
flashing light crossing, the only improvement option available would be installation of
gates, with an effectiveness of E3, a cost of C3, and an accident reduction/cost ratio of
AiE3/C3.
The individual accident reduction/cost ratios associated with these
improvements are selected by the algorithm to produce the maximum accident
reduction that can be obtained for a predetermined total cost. This total cost is the sum
of an integral number of equipment costs (C1, C2, and C3). The total maximum
accident reduction is the sum of the individual accident reductions of the form AE.
The resource allocation procedure is directed to identify high-hazard
crossings. To collect the necessary data and check for accuracy the input data and
substantiation of each recommendation a field diagnostic team should investigate
considered crossings. A sample of a worksheet for conducting this procedure is
presented in Appendix C. This worksheet also includes a method for proper
evaluating and revising the results, given by the computer model.
Federal Railroad Administration GradeDec Software
In order to provide assistance in grade crossing investment decision making
processes the FRA developed a highway-rail grade crossing investment analysis tool
GradeDec.NET (GradeDec). This software includes a full set of standard benefit-cost
metrics for a rail corridor, a region, or an individual grade crossing. GradeDec gives
the possibility to compare rail grade crossings improvement alternatives, designed to
mitigate highway-rail grade crossing collision risk and other components of user
costs, including: highway delay and queuing, air quality, and vehicle operating costs.
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online
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via

the

FRA's

Website

(http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/xings/com_roaduser/07010/sec05.htm).
The software helps states’ railway authorities develop the most effective (cost)
and beneficial (risk reduction) grade crossing investment strategies. It helps to predict
the development of the improvement project from the early stages of its application to
the final steps. Most of all, the model output can be computed by using a certain range
of the model inputs. It gives the opportunity to see the difference in the sets of project
and to choose the most applicable of the considered conditions. GradeDec employs a
corridor approach when analyzing the decrease in collision risk, which was developed
as part of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century's Next-Generation HighSpeed Rail Program. This approach is one of the most effective ways to reduce the
overall capital costs involved in constructing facilities for high-speed passenger rail
service (at speeds between 111 and 125 mph), where grade crossing hazards and
mitigation measures can be a major cost factor.
Accident Prediction Models Used by Different States
Tennessee Department of Transportation (TDOT) currently uses FRA (US
DOT) accident prediction model, carefully described above, to estimate the number of
accident at highway-rail at grade crossings within the state. Based on calculated
number of accidents and resource allocation procedure, the prioritizing of rail
crossings is conducted. The main aim of TDOT is to achieve the maximum total
reduction of accidents with respect to available monetary resources. At this point it
will be useful to make investigation on accident prediction methods, implemented by
other states, and compare them with US DOT, using the data from TRIMS database
for all public at grade rail crossings. The following accident prediction models were
mentioned in the literature review section (previously investigated by Virginia,
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Illinois and Missouri states): Florida Department of Transportation Accident
Prediction Model, Missouri’s Exposure Index Formula, Modified New Hampshire
formula, Kansas’s Design Hazard Rating Formula, California’s Hazard Rating
Formula, Connecticut’s Hazard Rating Formula, Illinois’s Modified Expected
Accident Frequency Formula, Peabody-Dimmick Formula, New Hamphire Formula.
Some approaches cannot be applied for Tennessee rail crossings (Florida Department
of Transportation Accident Prediction Model, Missouri’s Exposure Index Formula,
Modified New Hampshire formula, Kansas’s Design Hazard Rating Formula),
because they consider the effect of site distance. The information about site distance is
not provided neither by TRIMS or FRA Inventory databases. If this data is collected,
all accident prediction models could be implemented for all Tennessee highway-rail at
grade crossings. The rest of discussed accident prediction models will be applied and
the results will be presented.
California’s Hazard Rating Formula
The State of California uses the hazard rating formula, which includes four
factors: number of vehicles, number of trains, crossing protection type and the crash
history as input to the model. The difference with US DOT model is that California
Hazard Rating Formula uses a 10 – year accident history. The formula doesn’t
estimate the number of accident at each rail crossing, but it calculates the hazard
index, which helps to rank crossings by the possibility of accident to occur. The
highest priority should be assigned to the crossing with greater value of hazard index.
The following equation is used to calculate California’s Hazard Index:

where CaHIF - California’s Hazard Index value;
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V = number of vehicles;
T = number of trains;
PF – protection factor (see table 11);
AH =crash history (the total number of accident in the last 10 years).

Table 11
Protection Factor Values for California’s Hazard Rating Formula
Devices
PF
Stop sign or Cross buck

1.0

Flashing lights

0.33

Gates

0.13

Connecticut’s Hazard Rating Formula
The State of Connecticut uses the hazard rating formula, which is relatively
similar to California Hazard Rating Formula. It also incorporates four various factors:
annual average daily traffic, number of trains per day, crossing protection type and the
crash history as input to the model. The main difference is that Connecticut considers
the accident history for the last 5 years. The formula doesn’t estimate the number of
accident at each rail crossing, but it calculates the hazard index, which helps to rank
crossings by the possibility of accident to occur. The highest priority should be
assigned to the crossing with greater value of hazard index. The following equation is
used for Connecticut’s Hazard Rating Formula:

where CoHIF = Connecticut’s Hazard Index value;
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AADT = annual average daily traffic;
T = number of trains per day;
PF – protection factor (see table 12);
A =crash history (the total number of accident in the last 5 years).

Table 12
Protection Factor Values for Connecticut’s Hazard Rating Formula
Devices
PF
Stop sign or Cross buck

1.25

Flashing lights

0.25

Gates

0.01

Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula
The literature review section contains description of the study, conducted by
the State of Illinois, which was directed to evaluate the existing accident prediction
models (see Elzohairy & Benekohal, 2000). The authors also made a multiple nonlinear regression analysis in order to find those variable (highway and rail crossing
characteristics), which bring greater contribution to the final value of the accident
prediction/hazard index. As a result of investigation the following formula has been
developed (called Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula):

where IHI = Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency value;
A = ln (ADT * NTT);
ADT = average daily traffic;
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NTT = number of total trains per day;
B = MTS = maximum timetable speed, mph;
C = (NMT + NOOT) = number of the main tracks + the number of the other
tracks;
D = NOL = number of highway lanes;
N = average number of crashes per year;
PF = protection factor (35.57 – for gates; 68.97 - for flashing lights; 86.39 –
for passive).
The formula doesn’t estimate the number of accident at each rail crossing, but
it calculates the hazard index, which helps to rank crossings by the possibility of
accident to occur.
New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula
New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula is used by several states of the country.
Some states conducted additional research on accident prediction, using this model,
and introduced supplementary variables, such as Train speed, Highway speed, Sight
distance, Crossing angle, Crossing width, Type of tracks, Surface type, Population,
Number of buses, Number of school buses, Number of tracks, Surface condition,
Nearby intersection, Functional class of highway, Vertical alignment, Horizontal
alignment, Number of hazardous material trucks, Number of passengers, Number of
accidents. As it was mentioned before Modified New Hampshire Formula cannot be
applied for Tennessee rail crossings because of the lack of information. Nevertheless,
the scope of this work included implementation of original New Hamphire Hazard
Index Formula for Tennessee rail crossings. The formula doesn’t estimate the number
of accident at each rail crossing, but it calculates the hazard index, which helps to
rank crossings by the possibility of accident to occur. The highest priority should be
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assigned to the crossing with greater value of hazard index. The following equation is
used for the original New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula:
NHHI = V * T * PF
where NHHI = New Hamphire Hazard Index value;
V = annual average daily traffic;
T = average train daily traffic;
PF = protection factor (0.1 – for gates; 0.6 – for flashing lights; 1.0 – for signs
only).
Peabody-Dimmick Formula
Peabody-Dimmick Accident Prediction Formula has been developed in 1941
as a result of research, conducted for 3,563 rural crossings in 29 states. This formula
is used to determine the expected number of accidents in five years. The following
equation describes the Peabody-Dimmick Accident Prediction Model:
PDF = K + 1.28 * (V0.170) * (T0.151)/P0.171
where PDF = the expected number of accidents in 5 years;
V = annual average daily traffic factor;
T = average train daily traffic factor;
P = protection coefficient;
K = additional parameter.
The procedure of number of accidents calculations suggests the using of
various charts and graphs (see Figures 9 – 12). To simplify the process for each curve
a corresponding trendline has been found (in order to get a mathematical relationship
between variables). The approximation of all curves is presented at Figures 13 – 15).
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Figure 9 Relationship between Highway Traffic and Accident Factor
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986).
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration.

Figure 10 Relationship between Warning Device and Accident Factor
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986).
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration.
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Figure 11 Relationship between Railroad Traffic and Accident Factor
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986).
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration.

Figure 12 Relationship between K-factor and Unbalanced Accident Prediction
Source: Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, Second Edition. (1986).
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration.
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Figure 13 Relationship between Highway Traffic and V-Factor

Figure 14 Relationship between Railroad Traffic and T-Factor
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Figure 15 Relationship between K-factor and Unbalanced Accident Prediction

Comparison of FRA (US DOT) Accident Prediction Model with Models, Applied
by Other States
The scope of the current work included comparison of US DOT accident
prediction model with California’s Hazard Rating Formula, Connecticut’s Hazard
Rating Formula, Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula, PeabodyDimmick Formula and New Hamphire Formula. The main aim was to find the
difference between models and figure out which one gives the results, close to US
DOT. The analysis has been divided in two parts: comparison of approaches for
passive rail crossing and comparison of approaches for active crossings. Some
highway-rail at grade crossings were eliminated because of NaN values for accident
prediction/hazard index (for example, Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident
Frequency Formula has the variable, which is equal to the natural logarithm of
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product ADT and NTT; there are many rail crossings in TRIMS database (around
400), which have either zero ADT or NTT). Thus, removing of NaNs will make the
analysis and comparison of models more accurate.
The total number of passive crossings, taken for comparison, comprised 805.
All rail crossings were sorted based on the accident prediction/hazard index from the
highest value to the lowest and labeled with rank. The highest priority was assigned to
the crossing with greater value of accident prediction/hazard index, as recommended
by numerous studies. After that, the absolute difference between ranks, suggested by
US DOT Accident Prediction Formula and those, proposed by considered models,
were calculated in order to see how ranks vary. Average absolute difference in ranks
with US DOT Accident Prediction Formula has been computed for each accident
prediction/hazard index model. All calculations are provided in Appendix E. Final
results for passive highway-railroad at grade crossings are presented at the Figure 16.
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Figure 16 The Absolute Difference in Ranks with US DOT for Passive Crossings
Note:
ΔPDF – the absolute difference in ranks, suggested by US DOT Accident
Prediction Formula and Peabody-Dimmick Accident Prediction Formula;
ΔNHHI - the absolute difference in ranks, suggested by US DOT Accident
Prediction Formula and New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula;
ΔIHI - the absolute difference in ranks, suggested by US DOT Accident
Prediction Formula and Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula;
ΔCoHRF - the absolute difference in ranks, suggested by US DOT Accident
Prediction Formula and Connecticut’s Hazard Rating Formula;
ΔCaHRF - the absolute difference in ranks, suggested by US DOT Accident
Prediction Formula and California’s Hazard Rating Formula;
From the analysis of Tennessee at grade public passive rail crossings we can
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conclude, that Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula has the
lowest average absolute difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction
Formula (162.7 ranks). New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula showed relatively good
results (the difference comprised only 166.4 ranks). The highest average absolute
difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction Formula is obtained by
California’s Hazard Rating Formula (according to Figure 16 - 205.4 ranks).
Similar procedure has been performed for active crossings. The total number
of considered crossings, taken for comparison, comprised 1511. All rail crossings
were sorted based on the accident prediction/hazard index from the highest value to
the lowest and labeled with rank. The highest priority was assigned to the crossing
with greater value of accident prediction/hazard index, as recommended by numerous
studies. After that, the absolute difference between ranks, suggested by US DOT
Accident Prediction Formula and those, proposed by considered models, were
calculated in order to see how ranks vary. Average difference in ranks with US DOT
Accident Prediction Formula has been computed for each accident prediction/hazard
index model. All calculations and necessary details are provided in Appendix E. Final
results for active highway-railroad at grade crossings are presented at the Figure 17.
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Figure 17 The Absolute Difference in Ranks with US DOT for Active Crossings
From the first analysis of Tennessee at grade public active rail crossings we
can conclude that Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula has the
lowest average absolute difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction
Formula (only 290.8 ranks). New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula showed relatively
good results (the difference comprised only 300.5 ranks). The highest average
absolute difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction Formula is obtained
by California’s Hazard Rating Formula (according to Figure 17 - 345.1 ranks).
The scope of the current work also included supplemental comparison of
accident prediction/hazard index models to confirm the initial assumption that
Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula gives the closest results to
US DOT Accident Prediction Formula. All highway-rail crossings (both passive and
active categories) have been separated for 10 groups (10% of all crossings for each
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group). The objective was to estimate the percentage of rail crossings, suggested by
US DOT Accident Prediction Formula and considered accident prediction/hazard
index models for upgrading, which belongs to the same group. The average absolute
difference in ranks US DOT Accident Prediction Formula can be lower for a certain
accident prediction/hazard index model, but set of rail crossings, proposed for safety
improvement could be significantly different from the set of rail crossings, suggested
by US DOT Accident Prediction Formula. The results of this analysis are presented at
the Figure 18 for passive crossings and at the Figure 19 for active crossings. Figures
20 and 21 show the cumulative percentage of common active and passive crossings.

Figure 18 The Percentage of Common Passive Rail Crossings with US DOT for Each
Group
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Figure 19 The Percentage of Common Active Rail Crossings with US DOT for Each
Group
Consider the first group of rail crossings, which presents 10% of the most
hazardous Tennessee highway-railroad public at grade crossings, proposed by various
accident prediction/hazard index models for upgrading. The highest percentage of
common passive crossings has been observed for Connecticut’s Hazard Rating
Formula (48.8%). Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula and
New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula showed the same results (47.5% of common
passive crossings). The lowest percentage of common passive crossings has been
obtained by California’s Hazard Rating Formula (30.0%). As for active rail crossings,
the highest percentage has been demonstrated again by Connecticut’s Hazard Rating
Formula (68.7%). New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula has 65.3% of common
active rail crossings for the first group. Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident
Frequency Formula has 54.7% of common active rail crossings for the first group.
The lowest percentage of common active crossings has been obtained again by
California’s Hazard Rating Formula (24.7%).
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Figure 20 The Cumulative Percentage of Common Passive Rail Crossings with US
DOT for Each Group

Figure 21 The Cumulative Percentage of Common Active Rail Crossings with US
DOT for Each Group
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Thus, from the analysis of groups for percentage of common active and
passive crossings, we cannot state, that Modified Expected Accident Frequency
Formula gives the closest results to US DOT Accident Prediction Formula (it has the
same percentage of the common passive crossings with New Hamphire Hazard Index
Formula for the first group, but lower percentage of the common active crossings).
In this case it is necessary to conduct additional test. The first group of 10% of
the most hazardous highway-rail crossings has been considered. The analysis
consisted in the following. The average absolute difference of a certain accident
prediction/hazard index model in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction Formula
has been estimated only for those rail crossings, which were proposed for safety
improvement by US DOT Accident Prediction Formula (this test combined the first
two investigations). Other values of absolute difference were rejected. The results of
this test are presented at the Figure 22 for passive crossings and at the Figure 23 for
active crossings.
From the last test we can state that Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident
Frequency Formula and New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula showed almost the
same weighted average difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction
Formula for passive rail crossings (8.8 percent and 8.7 percent correspondingly),
which is lower in comparison with other models. But the weighted average difference
in ranks of Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula with US DOT
Accident Prediction Formula (10.4 percent) is considerably lower for active rail
crossings than for New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula (34.1 percent).
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Figure 22 The Average Weighted Difference with US DOT for the First Group of
Passive Crossings

Figure 23 The Average Weighted Difference with US DOT for the First Group of
Active Crossings
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From the first analysis of Tennessee at grade public rail crossings we can
conclude that Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula has the
lowest average absolute difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction
Formula (only 162.7 ranks for passive and 290.8 ranks for active crossings). New
Hamphire Hazard Index Formula showed relatively good results (the difference
comprised only 166.4 ranks for passive and 300.5 ranks for active crossings). The
highest average absolute difference in ranks with US DOT Accident Prediction
Formula is obtained by California’s Hazard Rating Formula. From the second analysis
we can conclude that Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula and
New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula showed the same results (47.5% of common
passive crossings) for passive crossings. But New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula
has 65.3% of common active rail crossings for the first group, while Illinois’s
Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula has only 54.7% of common active
rail crossings for the first group. From the last analysis we can state that Illinois’s
Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula and New Hamphire Hazard Index
Formula showed almost the same weighted average difference in ranks with US DOT
Accident Prediction Formula for passive rail crossings (8.8% and 8.7%
correspondingly), which is lower in comparison with other models. But the weighted
average difference in ranks of Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency
Formula with US DOT Accident Prediction Formula (10.4%) is considerably lower
for active rail crossings than for New Hamphire Hazard Index Formula (34.1%).
For the final conclusion, we can state that for both passive and active
highway-rail at crossings Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula
gives the closest results to US DOT Accident Prediction Formula. New Hamphire
Hazard Index Formula showed relatively close results. It was also observed that
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California’s Hazard Rating Formula gives the greatest variance in ranks with US DOT
Accident Prediction Formula for passive and active public rail crossings.
Conclusion
The review presented herein provides useful information as to how current
methods are employed to comparatively analyze highway-rail grade crossing projects
for funding. The current approaches show the factors that are considered nowadays
for improvement projects, such as risk reduction, project cost, and the relationship
between risk reduction effectiveness and cost. Existing methods do present
shortcomings associated to accurate datasets, minimal validation of method results,
and reduced accuracy creating additional manual and mathematical effort to conclude
processes. Current approaches provide a platform to advance the accepted state-ofpractice and develop future efforts.
The methods, with modification to consider the goals of TDOT, could prove to
be useful for additional highway-rail grade crossing program decision making. Future
development should address the shortcomings of the current state-of-practice in
addition to consideration of the outcomes and goals anticipated from the advancement
of resource allocation or funding decision making methods. Comparison of US DOT
Accident Prediction Model, currently used by the State of Tennessee, with accident
prediction/hazard index models, employed by other states, shows that the closest
results are obtained by Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula. At
this point it can be recommended to start implementation of Illinois’s Modified
Expected Accident Frequency Formula for Tennessee rail crossings and to check its
accuracy over a certain time period (several years).
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4. MODEL DEVELOPMENT
As it was mentioned earlier, the main objective of the current study is to
develop the model, which allocates available monetary resources between highwayrail grade crossings of the Tennessee State (information is given by TRIMS database)
and maximizes the total benefits in terms of accident and severity reduction. Two
different approaches were created, such as Sorting Algorithm (SA) and Mathematical
Model (MM).
Sorting Algorithm (SA)
The first methodology works as follows. First of all, all data, necessary for
accident prediction calculations, is collected from TRIMS and FRA Accident/Injury
databases. Based on physical and operational characteristics of each crossing the
initial accident prediction value is estimated. Using the information about accidents in
past 5 years from FRA Accident/Injury database the final accident prediction value is
computed. After the normalized accident prediction value is calculated for each
crossing as multiplication of the final accident prediction by normalizing constant. In
the current work the normalizing constants from 2010 were used.
The objective aims to provide investments for countermeasures
implementation at those crossings, which will bring the maximum accident reduction.
Most of all, severity of accidents was considered for each crossing. Severity of
accident was separated by three categories:


Fatality accident;



Injury accident;



Property damage accident;

To measure the difference between severity categories, the cost of accident has
been introduced and applied in calculations (see Table 13).
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Table 13
Cost of Accident by Severity Category
Type of accident
Cost of accident, US dollars
Fatality accident
30,000
Injury accident
20,000
Property damage accident
10,000

As it was mentioned before, according to Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing
Handbook (2007), there are three possible traffic control improvement alternatives in
the resource allocation procedure: from passive to flashing lights, from passive to
gates, from flashing lights to gates. Effectiveness of each countermeasure and cost are
provided below in Table 14.

Table 14
Characteristics of Different Countermeasure Types
Type of countermeasure
Effectiveness
Passive to flashing lights
0.70
Passive to gates
0.83
Flashing lights to gates
0.69

Cost, US dollars
30,000
150,000
150,000

The sorting procedure has been performed based on three benefit options:


e/c ratios;



a*e/c ratios;



s*e/c ratios;

Computational results of Sorting Algorithm and comparison with another
solution approach are presented in the next section.
Mathematical Model (MM)
The second approach was developed in order to compare it with SA heuristic
and find out which one gives better results in terms of accident reduction. Sometimes
heuristics provide solutions, which are considerably different from optimal and are
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not implemented because of inefficiency. The formulation of model is provided
below.
SETS
Set of countermeasures
Set of highway-rail grade crossings
DECISION VARIABLES
=1 if countermeasure i is implemented at rail
crossing j and zero otherwise
AUXILIARY VARIABLES
=1 if countermeasure i can be potentially
implemented at rail crossing j and zero otherwise
PARAMETERS
accident prediction value at rail crossing j
cost of countermeasure i
effectiveness of countermeasure i
fatal accident prediction value at rail crossing j
injury accident prediction value at rail crossing j
property damage accident prediction value at rail
crossing j
budget available
cost of fatal accident
cost of injury accident
cost of property damage accident

OBJECTIVES
(1)

(2)
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SUBJECT TO:

(3)

(4)

(5)

The first objective is directed to maximize the total accident reduction. The
second objective aims to maximize the total weighted accident reduction by severity
category. Constraint 3 ensures that the total cost of all implemented countermeasures
at chosen rail crossings will not exceed the budget available. Constraint 4 states that
no more than one countermeasure i can be applied at rail crossing j. Constraint 5
indicates that countermeasure i can be implemented only at potentially considered rail
crossing j.
As for parameters, accident prediction value at rail crossing j (a(j)) was taken
from TRIMS database for each crossing. Cost ( ) and effectiveness ( ) of each
countermeasure i were taken from Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook,
2007 (see Table 14). It was assumed that total investments for safety improvements at
highway-rail crossings (C) comprised $2,500,000. Fatal, injury and property damage
accident prediction values at rail crossing j were estimated using equations, provided
by GradeDec software. Cost of each type of accident (w1, w2, w3) is presented in Table
13.
Auxiliary binary variable

has been introduced to indicate could be a

particular countermeasure i be implemented at rail crossing j or not. There are specific
restrictions, established by FRA, for certain countermeasures:
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1) If the rail crossing is passive and number of trucks is equal to 1, it is
possible to upgrade crossing to flashing lights and gates;
2) If the rail crossing is passive and number of trucks is more than 1, only
gates can be implemented;
3) To upgrade rail crossing with flashing lights only gates can be considered
as improvement;
4) Rail crossings with gates are not subject to upgrading;
A decision variable

shows each rail crossing and suggested

countermeasure, which should be applied in order to satisfy objectives 1 and 2.
Computational results for all at-grade rail crossings from TRIMS database are
presented in the next section.
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5. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
Both solution approaches, Sorting Algorithm (SA) and Mathematical Model
(MM), were applied for all at-grade rail public crossings of Tennessee State, provided
by TRIMS database. The overall number of rail crossings in TRIMS database
comprises 5716, the total number of at-grade public crossings is 2873. The main
assumptions, constants and parameters for SA and MM were described in the chapter
4.
Sorting Algorithm
The first approach (SA) has been created using Matlab 7.0. Three different
sorting procedures were implemented:
1) Sorting based on e/c ratio;
2) Sorting based on a*e/c ratio;
3) Sorting based on s*e/c ratio;
It was observed that all three sorting procedures suggest to make
improvements for 83 passive rail crossings and upgrade them to flashing lights with
the total budget usage of $2,490,000 (among $2,500,000 available). It was observed
that none of sorting methods offered upgrading of passive rail crossings to gates and
flashing lights crossings to gates. Table 15 represents the total accident and severity
reduction for each sorting option.
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Table 15
Results Provided by Sorting Algorithm
SA based on e/c
SA based on e/c
TotalCost
a*e
s*e
TotalCost a*(1-e)
s*(1-e)
2490000 2.360948 34153.4 2490000 1.011835 14637.17
SA based on ae/c
SA based on ae/c
TotalCost
a*e
s*e
TotalCost a*(1-e)
s*(1-e)
2490000 8.854448 128595.5 2490000 3.794764 55112.34
SA based on se/c
SA based on se/c
TotalCost
a*e
s*e
TotalCost a*(1-e)
s*(1-e)
2490000 8.822772 129100
2490000 3.781188 55328.56

It can be concluded that sorting based on e/c ratio is not efficient, because it
gives considerably lower values of accident reduction and severity reduction as well.
Sorting based on a*e /c ratio shows considerably higher accident and severity
reduction than sorting based on e/c ratio, slightly higher accident reduction than
sorting based on s*e/c ratio, and lower severity reduction than sorting based on s*e/c
ratio. Most of all, it is necessary to point out that cost of accident by severity was
taken randomly. It was assumed that one fatality accident is equal to 2 injury
accidents and 3 property damage accidents (see section 4). To make more accurate
calculations in terms of severity additional information should be provided by TDOT.
And after it will be possible to judge which sorting procedure gives the best results.
Mathematical Model
Solution of the model (see the formulation in the section 4) has been
performed using GAMS 23.8.2. SA approach demonstrated inefficiency of e/c ratio
consideration. Thus, the first objective of MM is directed to maximize the total
accident reduction with restriction of the budget available. The second objective aims
to maximize the total weighted accident reduction by severity category.
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The total budget usage for the first and second objectives comprised
$2,490,000 (among $2,500,000 available), which is similar to the amount of
investments, provided by SA. But countermeasures, proposed by MM, were different
in comparison with SA. Solution of the first objective suggests making improvements
for 68 passive rail crossings with upgrading them to flashing lights, and 3 flashing
lights rail crossings with upgrading them to gates. Solution of the second objective
suggests making improvements for 73 passive rail crossings with upgrading them to
flashing lights, and 2 flashing lights rail crossings with upgrading them to gates.
Similar to Sorting Algorithm, MM doesn’t offer upgrading of passive rail crossings to
gates. Table 16 represents the total accident and severity reduction for each objective.

Table 16
Results Provided by Mathematical Model
MM based on a*e/c
MM based on a*e/c
TotalCost a*e
s*e
TotalCost a*(1-e)
s*(1-e)
2490000 9.212 132484.0 2490000
3.98
57210.54
MM based on s*e/c
MM based on s*e/c
TotalCost a*e
s*e
TotalCost a*(1-e)
s*(1-e)
2490000 9.183 132888.9 2490000
3.959
57264.75

It can be concluded that MM based on a*e /c ratio shows slightly higher
accident reduction than MM based on s*e/c ratio, and lower severity reduction than
MM based on s*e/c ratio (which is similar to results obtained by SA). In this case it is
necessary to underline again, that additional data, related to the cost of accident by
severity, should be provided by TDOT to achieve more accurate results. In general,
GAMS showed good results and computational time, solving the first objective of the
model in 0.047 sec and the second objective in 0.093 sec for 2873 rail crossings.
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Comparison of Methodologies
As it was mentioned earlier, SA and MM propose different ways of monetary
resources allocation. SA based on a*e /c ratio shows, that improvements should be
provided at 83 passive rail crossings to flashing lights. MM based on a*e /c ratio
suggests to make improvements for 73 passive rail crossings with upgrading them to
flashing lights, and 2 flashing lights rail crossings with upgrading them to gates. SA
based on s*e /c ratio shows, that improvements should be provided at 83 passive rail
crossings to flashing lights (similar to SA based on a*e /c ratio, but the list of
recommended rail crossings for upgrading is different). MM based on a*e /c ratio
suggests to make improvements for 68 passive rail crossings with upgrading them to
flashing lights, and 3 flashing lights rail crossings with upgrading them to gates. In
order to find which methodology is better corresponding accident reduction and
weighted accident reduction by severity values should be compared. Accident
reduction (a*e) and weighted accident reduction (s*e) by severity for SA and MM
based on different benefit options are presented at Figures 24-27. The number of
accidents after proposed countermeasures implementation (a*(1-e) and s*(1-e)) is
presented at Figures 28-31.
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Figure 24 Comparison of SA and MM Based on a*e/c Ratio and a*e Value

Figure 25 Comparison of SA and MM Based on a*e/c Ratio and s*e Value
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Figure 26 Comparison of SA and MM Based on s*e/c Ratio and a*e Value

Figure 27 Comparison of SA and MM Based on s*e/c Ratio and s*e Value
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Figure 28 Comparison of SA and MM Based on a*e/c Ratio and a*(1-e) Value

Figure 29 Comparison of SA and MM Based on a*e/c Ratio and s*(1-e) Value
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Figure 30 Comparison of SA and MM Based on s*e/c Ratio and a*(1-e) Value

Figure 31 Comparison of SA and MM Based on s*e/c Ratio and s*(1-e) Value
Analyzing Figures 24-31, it can be concluded that Mathematical Model
outperformed results of Sorting Algorithm based on a*e/c and s*e/ratios for both
accident reduction and weighted accident reduction by severity. It was also observed
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that the overall number of accidents was higher for Mathematical Model than for
Sorting Algorithm after countermeasures implementation. This fact means that
Mathematical Model proposes more hazardous rail crossings for safety improvement
and gives the greater accident reduction and weighted accident reduction by severity
values. It is necessary to point out, the cost of countermeasures is subject to change
and this fact should be considered before application of the model.
Sensitivity of the Models
For a given input data with budget available of $2,500,000 the Mathematical
Model (MM) outperformed the Sorting Algorithm (SA). But we cannot state in
general that MM is better than SA before checking both models for different values of
budget available (sensitivity of models). Changing of constraints values makes a
significant influence at the model. In the current work budget range from $200,000 up
to $$4,200,000 was considered. For a particular value of budget a*e, a*(1-e), s*e,
s*(1-e) were calculated applying MM and SA. The results are presented in Tables 17 20 and Figures 32 - 39.
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Table 17
Sensitivity of SA Based on a*e/c
SA based on a*e/c
TotalCost
a*e
a*(1-e)
s*e
180000 1.294988 0.554995 18519.23
390000 2.226838 0.954359 31498.35
570000 2.970597 1.273113 42122.87
780000 3.751651 1.60785 53724.11
1170000 5.075771 2.17533 73260.94
1470000 6.025503 2.582358 87138.94
1770000 6.914407 2.963317 100546.9
2070000 7.751079 3.321891 112850.3
2490000 8.854448 3.794764 128595.5
2790000 9.604151 4.116065 139132.8
3090000 10.32911 4.426761 149727.8
3480000 11.23738 4.816021 162479.2
3780000 11.92326 5.117131 171802.6
4170000 12.77739 5.483186 183877.2

s*(1-e)
7936.811
13499.29
18052.66
23024.62
31397.55
37345.26
43091.53
48364.42
55112.34
59628.33
64169.04
69633.94
73720.8
78895.66

Table 18
Sensitivity of SA Based on s*e/c
SA based on s*e/c
TotalCost
a*e
a*(1-e)
s*e
180000 1.294988 0.554995 18519.23
390000 2.210237 0.947244 31719.13
570000 2.966126 1.271197 42259.96
780000 3.747696 1.606156 53779.23
1170000 5.055337 2.166573 73553.33
1470000 6.013405 2.577174 87549.52
1770000 6.88244 2.949617 100748.2
2070000 7.736612 3.315691 113111.4
2490000 8.822772 3.781188
129100
2790000 9.562801 4.098343 139983.6
3090000 10.29075 4.41032
150295
3480000 11.19352 4.797221 163188.3
3780000 11.87502 5.089292 172734.1
4170000 12.71411 5.448905 184487.2

s*(1-e)
7936.811
13593.91
18111.41
23048.24
31522.86
37521.22
43177.8
48476.3
55328.56
59992.98
64412.13
69937.86
74028.91
79065.95
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Table 19
Sensitivity of MM Based on a*e/c
MM based on a*e/c
TotalCost
a*e
a*(1-e)
s*e
180000
1.295
0.555 18519.23
390000
2.227
0.954 31498.35
570000
2.894
1.24
41387.39
780000
3.819
1.65
54226.91
1170000 5.192
2.238 74369.68
1470000 6.204
2.682 88347.29
1770000 7.154
3.089 102225.3
2070000 8.043
3.47
115633.3
2490000 9.212
3.98
132484
2790000 10.015 4.332 143906.5
3090000 10.794 4.666 155234.2
3480000 11.764 5.082 169012.1
3780000 12.481 5.389 179277.7
4170000 13.386 5.784 191519.5

s*(1-e)
7936.811
13499.29
17737.45
23418.12
32050.74
38175.47
44123.19
49869.46
57210.54
62225.75
67080.47
72985.27
77384.83
82722.45

Table 20
Sensitivity of MM Based on s*e/c
MM based on s*e/c
TotalCost
a*e
a*(1-e)
s*e
180000
1.295
0.555
18519.23
390000
2.21
0.947
31719.13
570000
2.954
1.266
42197.54
780000
3.819
1.65
54226.91
1170000 5.191
2.237
74806.03
1470000
6.15
2.649
89238.46
1770000 7.076
3.045
102861.5
2070000 8.011
3.457
115834.6
2490000 9.183
3.959
132888.9
2790000 9.995
4.324
144441.3
3090000 10.762 4.653
155738.7
3480000 11.716 5.061
169756.1
3780000 12.441 5.372
179980.3
4170000 13.34
5.757
192723.8
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s*(1-e)
7936.811
13593.91
18084.66
23418.12
32237.74
38423.07
44261.51
49955.73
57264.75
62454.95
67296.69
73304.15
77685.96
83147.42

Figure 32 Values of a*e Based on a*e/c Sorting

Figure 33 Values of a*(1-e) Based on a*e/c Sorting
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Figure 34 Values of s*e Based on a*e/c Sorting

Figure 35 Values of s*(1-e) Based on a*e/c Sorting
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Figure 36 Values of a*e Based on s*e/c Sorting

Figure 37 Values of a*(1-e) Based on s*e/c Sorting
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Figure 38 Values of s*e Based on s*e/c Sorting

Figure 39 Values of s*(1-e) Based on s*e/c Sorting

77

From the conducted analysis we can conclude that for all indicators (a*e
values, which represent the total accident reduction; s*e values, which represent the
total weighted accident reduction by severity category; a*(1-e) values, which
represent the total number of accidents left after suggested countermeasures
implementation; s*(1-e) values, which represent the total number of weighted
accidents by severity category left after suggested countermeasures implementation)
MM outperformed SA for the budget available, ranging from $200,000 up to
$$4,200,000. Thus, MM proposes safety improvements, which result in greater
reduction of the total number accidents and the total number of weighted accidents by
severity category as well. The difference between MM and SA for a*e and s*e values
increase as the budget available enlarges. Most of all, MM suggests implementation
of countermeasures at more hazardous highway-railway public crossings (which is
shown by the greater a*(1-e) values and s*(1-e) values for the greater reduction of the
total number accidents and the total number of weighted accidents by severity
category) in comparison with SA. The difference between MM and SA for a*(1-e)
and s*(1-e) values increase as the budget available enlarges.
So, the Mathematical Model (MM) outperforms the Sorting Algorithm (SA)
based on sensitivity analysis and it is recommended for the further usage in order to
allocate the available monetary resources between highway-railroad public at grade
Tennessee crossings to apply the Mathematical Model (MM).
The Logit Model for Accident Prediction by Severity Category
The main aim of the current work is the development of highway-railroad at
grade crossings prioritizing model. The model should identify those rail crossings
which will result in the maximum benefit in terms of accident reduction/weighted
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accident reduction by severity category after certain countermeasures implementation
for the given budget. Severity of accidents was separated by three categories:


Fatality accident;



Injury accident;



Property damage accident;

To estimate the weighted accident prediction by severity category, it is
necessary to calculate the number of predicted fatality, injury and property damage
accidents. Equations, proposed by GradeDec software, were used for this purpose. In
the section of literature review the paper, written by Hu et al. (2009), was mentioned.
The authors use the Logit model to predict the number of accidents by severity
category. In this case it will be useful to apply the Logit model and compare results
with output of the GradeDec model.
Hu et al. (2009) define a generalized logit as

where x – set of highway-railroad crossing characteristics;
j – set of severity categories;
πj – the probability of accident j to happen;
π0 – the probability of a “pivot“ accident to happen;
Set of highway-railroad crossing characteristics included the same parameters,
which are used by GradeDec model: maximum time table trains peed, miles per hour;
through trains per day; switch trains per day; binary variable, if crossing is urban,
Urban = 1,else Urban = 0; number of the main rail road tracks. As it was mentioned
before set of severity categories contains fatality, injury and property damage
accidents.
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Hu et al. (2009) propose to form a logit as a linear predictor

where α and β – coefficients of the multinomial logistic regression.
To find the relationship between number of each severity category and
variables, describing highway-railroad crossing characteristics, the multinomial
logistic regression analysis has been conducted using Matlab 7.0. The accident history
for the last 10 years data has been uploaded from FRA accident/injury database to
compute the actual number of fatality, injury and property damage accidents for each
public at grade crossing of TN State. The results are presented in the Table 21. The
relationship between predictors and response variables turned out to be:
Logit (PDO) = 29.95249 - 0.12046*X1 - 0.03353*X2 - 0.39736*X3 19.1145*X4 - 0.71761*X5;
Logit (Injury) = 27.43512 - 0.10406*X1 - 0.20236*X2 - 0.47232*X3 20.4985*X4 + 1.606862*X5,
where X1 – maximum time table train speed, miles per hour;
X2 – through trains per day;
X3 – switch trains per day;
X4 - binary variable, if crossing is urban, Urban=1, else Urban=0;
X5 – number of the main rail road tracks.
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Table 21
The FRA 2010 Accident Data by Severity Category
Actual number of accidents (FRA 2010)
№ cross.\Acc. Type Fatalities Injuries PDO
1
2
0
0
2
1
0
0
3
1
0
0
4
1
0
0
5
1
0
0
6
1
0
0
7
1
0
0
8
1
0
0
9
1
0
0
10
1
0
0
11
0
1
0
12
1
0
0
13
1
0
0
14
1
0
0
15
1
0
0
16
1
0
0
17
1
0
0
18
1
0
0
19
1
0
0
20
0
1
0
21
1
0
0
22
0
0
1
23
1
0
0
24
0
1
0
25
1
0
0
26
1
0
0
27
0
1
0
28
1
0
0
29
1
0
0
30
1
0
0
31
1
0
0
32
1
0
0
33

1

0

0
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Fatality accident has been taken as a “pivot” accident. The probability of the
accident by severity category for the given crossing can be calculated as (see Hu et al.
2009):

This formula has been applied for each highway-railroad at grade crossing to
find the probability of fatality, injury and property damage accidents to happen. To
find the actual number of accidents by severity, proposed by the Logit model, the
accident prediction values for each crossing (given by TRIMS database) were
multiplied by corresponding probability of the considered category. The results of
computations are presented in Table 22.
Comparison of the Logit and GradeDec Models
Table 22 and Figure 40 show the predicted number of accidents by severity
category, using the Logit model and the GradeDec model for those at grade public
highway-railroad crossings, at which accidents have been observed in 2010 according
to FRA accident/injury database.
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Figure 40 Comparison of the Logit and GradeDec Models
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Table 22
Comparison of the Logit and GradeDec Models
Results of Logit Model
Results of GradeDec
PDO
Injuries
Fatalities
Fatalities
Injuries
PDO
0,180243
0,015249
0,000334 0,007771 0,063427 0,124629
0,051122
0,006792
0,005512 0,006168 0,020492 0,036766
0,116204
0,030117
0,004032 0,013628 0,048815 0,087912
0,055405
0,007011
0,010470 0,005158 0,021754 0,045974
0,066708
0,008222
0,010701 0,008065 0,027192 0,050374
0,065680
0,006775
0,000428 0,005170 0,024078 0,043635
0,060986
0,012779
0,000018 0,001044 0,016525 0,056213
0,049133
0,000746
0,000035 0,000657 0,010573 0,038684
0,051482
0,000782
0,000037 0,000688 0,011079 0,040534
0,020873
0,004374
0,000006 0,000357 0,005656 0,019239
0,153394
0,117042
0,000000 0,014428 0,094376 0,161632
0,086199
0,054250
0,000000 0,011854 0,054018 0,074577
0,101667
0,001920
0,011017 0,012571 0,039385 0,062647
0,154151
0,031259
0,000036 0,002107 0,039531 0,143810
0,044302
0,010785
0,000006 0,000857 0,013244 0,040992
0,000000
0,000000
0,000000 0,000000 0,000000 0,000000
0,173383
0,014185
0,000000 0,003771 0,054145 0,129653
0,338566
0,035591
0,004721 0,024344 0,118153 0,236382
0,001516
0,000178
0,000000 0,000126 0,000654 0,000914
0,051464
0,009957
0,000078 0,001774 0,016131 0,043595
0,260047
0,027337
0,003626 0,018698 0,090751 0,181561
0,128149
0,012292
0,011640 0,013348 0,048510 0,090222
0,025253
0,003944
0,000969 0,002838 0,009991 0,017337
0,042689
0,008162
0,000083 0,001932 0,014376 0,034625
0,114525
0,001946
0,000008 0,001991 0,029995 0,084493
0,152498
0,025575
0,001399 0,006128 0,047157 0,126187
0,129523
0,006735
0,011477 0,015787 0,050118 0,081831
0,005649
0,000135
0,000000 0,000090 0,001390 0,004303
0,223782
0,002320
0,000427 0,001445 0,039409 0,185676
0,055277
0,006359
0,000395 0,000785 0,012749 0,048496
0,114425
0,016385
0,008292 0,014283 0,046243 0,078576
0,085565
0,017174
0,005798 0,010928 0,035715 0,061894
0,162573
0,014815
0,013638 0,012947 0,058003 0,120078
3,32243
0,51119
0,10518 0,2217396 1,16364 2,55344
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It can be concluded that the Logit model gives lower number of fatalities,
approximately the same number of injuries (slightly lower) and higher number of
property damage accidents in comparison with the GradeDec model. Nevertheless, the
coefficients of determination (which represent the accuracy of model and how well it
fits), were relatively low for the Logit model: for PDO accidents – 0.274, for injury
accidents – 0.109, for fatalities – 0.026. In order to make a correct evaluation of each
model output additional research, connected with site investigation at each highwayrailroad at grade crossing, should be conducted. After that it is possible to state which
model is better and needs to be applied. In the current work the GradeDec model
(which is used commonly used within the country) has been implemented for
estimation of accidents by severity category, as it is recommended by US DOT.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
According to Section 130 the United States Department of Transportation
(USDOT) provides funding assistance to state departments of transportation to
implement highway-rail grade crossing improvement programs. These programs are
suspect to develop particular safety improvement actions in order to decrease the
number of accidents at highway-rail grade crossings. The current work was dedicated
to allocate available monetary resources between highway-rail grade crossings of the
Tennessee State (information is given by TRIMS database) and maximize the total
benefits in terms of accident and severity reduction. The scope of work included the
literature review with description of hazard index/accident prediction methodologies,
widely used by various DOTs; careful investigation of the accident prediction method,
applied by TDOT; development of the model to satisfy the established goals and
computational results, demonstrated benefits and negative sites of both models.
Comparison of US DOT Accident Prediction Model, currently used by the
State of Tennessee, with accident prediction/hazard index models, employed by other
states, shows that the closest results are obtained by Illinois’s Modified Expected
Accident Frequency Formula. At this point it can be recommended to start
implementation of Illinois’s Modified Expected Accident Frequency Formula for
Tennessee rail crossings and to check its accuracy over a certain time period (several
years).
The scope of the conducted work also included application of the Logit model
for accident prediction by severity category. It was observed that the Logit model
gave lower number of fatalities, approximately the same number of injuries (slightly
lower) and higher number of property damage accidents in comparison with the
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GradeDec model. Additional research should be provided at that point to evaluate
which model is better for highway-railroad public crossings of Tennessee State.
It was concluded that Mathematical Model was more efficient than Sorting
Algorithm, because MM provided greater accident reduction and weighted accident
reduction by severity. In comparison with SA, MM proposed safety improvements not
only from passive rail crossings to flashing lights, but also upgrading of flashing
lights rail crossings to gates. Nevertheless, it is necessary to specify the main aim of
investments: to reduce the overall number of accidents or to decrease the number of
fatalities, injuries and property damage accidents, taking into consideration that the
cost of fatality is greater than the cost of injury and the cost of injury is greater than
the cost of property damage accident. For the first case it is better to use MM with the
first objective. For the second case it is better to use MM with the second objective.
GAMS showed a good computational time for 2873 rail crossings.
Besides, there are several issues, which should be considered in the future
research. The cost of accident was set based on assumption, that one fatality is equal
to 2 injuries of 3 property damage accidents. The nature of relationship between those
severity categories could be more complex. This question should be addressed by
TDOT before application of the proposed model. Most of all, cost of countermeasures
was taken from Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook (2007), which are
subject to change to higher values. The resource allocation procedure can be extended
and new countermeasures may be introduced. But in this case additional information
should be provided by TDOT. It is recommended to check the sensitivity of the
model, using larger size of input data (e.g., consider public at-grade highway-rail
crossings of other states).
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For the final conclusion, Mathematical Model, developed in the current work,
can be used as a powerful tool to solve a relatively complex problem of monetary
resources allocation between highway-rail crossings to maximize the safety and to
follow specific requirements, established by the United States Department of
Transportation.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
US DOT Accident Prediction Factor Values for Crossings with Different
Warning Devices
US DOT Accident Prediction Factor Values for Crossings with Passive Warning
Devices

96

US DOT Accident Prediction Factor Values for Crossings with Flashing Light
Warning Devices
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US DOT Accident Prediction Factor Values for Crossings with Gate Warning
Devices

98

Appendix B
US DOT Final Accident Prediction from Initial Prediction and Accident History
US DOT Final Accident Prediction from Initial Prediction and Accident History (1
year of accident data (T = 1))
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US DOT Final Accident Prediction from Initial Prediction and Accident History (2
years of accident data (T = 2))
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US DOT Final Accident Prediction from Initial Prediction and Accident History (3
years of accident data (T = 3))
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US DOT Final Accident Prediction from Initial Prediction and Accident History (4
years of accident data (T = 4))
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US DOT Final Accident Prediction from Initial Prediction and Accident History (5
years of accident data (T = 5))
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Appendix C
Resource Allocation Procedure Field Verification Worksheet
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